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ABSTRACT
Central banking is intimately related to liquidity provision to banks during times of crisis, the
lender-of-last-resort function.  This activity arose endogenously in certain banking systems.  Depositors
lack full information about the value of bank assets so that during macroeconomic downturns they
monitor their banks by withdrawing in a banking panic.  The likelihood of panics depends on the
industrial organization of the banking system.  Banking systems with many small, undiversified banks,
are prone to panics and failures, unlike systems with a few big banks that are heavily branched and well
diversified.  Systems of many small banks are more efficient if the banks form coalitions during times
of crisis.  We provide conditions under which the industrial organization of banking leads to incentive
compatible state contingent bank coalition formation.  Such coalitions issue money that is a kind of
deposit insurance and examine and supervise banks.  Bank coalitions of small banks, however, cannot
replicate the efficiency of a system of big banks.
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The most important function of a central bank is to provide liquidity to the banking system in 
times of crisis.   The classic work on central banking, Lombard Street, by Walter Bagehot, 
published in 1873, offered the advice that in times of panic the central bank (Bank of England) 
should lend freely and continue to pay out currency.  At the time Lombard Street was published, 
there was no central bank in the U.S. and yet the private arrangement of banks in the U.S. 
clearinghouse system had already discovered Bagehot’s precepts and was acting on them.  In this 
paper we argue that the lender-of-last-resort function of “central banking” arose endogenously 
through the formation of state contingent bank coalitions, such as clearinghouses, which provided 
liquidity during banking panics.  Moreover, in the model we propose, banking panics are not 
irrational manifestations of multiple equilibria.  Rather, they represent depositors monitoring their 
banks in banking systems composed of many small banks.  Since panics do not happen in 
banking systems with large, heavily branched, well diversified, banks, this is consistent with the 
historical experience of countries internationally. 
A thesis of this paper is that central banking (the lender-of-last-resort) emerges as a response to 
the banking system’s problems.  The problem is the ability of depositors to monitor their banks.  
Monitoring banks corresponds to banking panics, and such panics may involve inefficiencies 
because banks may be mistakenly liquidated.  Another thesis we develop is that banking panics 
are not a manifestation of an inherent problem with banks per se.  On the contrary, the theory we 
develop views panics as a rational form of monitoring of banks by uninformed depositors.   
Briefly, depositors know the state of the macroeconomy, but not the idiosyncratic state of their 
own bank.  The way to check on a bank is to ask the bank to convert its demand deposits into 
currency.  But, banks as a whole cannot do this and then the banking system faces liquidation.  
Historically, and in the model we present, banks form coalitions that can turn illiquid loan 
portfolios into liquid claims that can convince depositors that the banks, as a group, are solvent, 
even if a depositor’s particular bank is not.  This is the lender-of-last-resort function. 
The model closely follows the U.S. experience with panics, not surprisingly since the U.S. is the 
leading example of the case of frequent banking panics.  In the case of the U.S., liquidity 
provision by banks literally took the form of private money called “clearinghouse loan 
certificates.”  These certificates were issued by bank coalitions and functioned as a form of 
deposit insurance from the point of view of depositors because they served to convert claims on a 




certificates required that banks coinsure each other.  Moreover, for this insurance system to work, 
there must be banking panics that impose externalities on the banks doing well, forcing them to 
subsidize other banks.  We show how banking panics play a critical economic function enforcing 
the incentive compatibility of bank coalitions.  In order for the bank coalition to form during 
times of panic, the banks had to agree to mutually monitor each other to enforce reserve and 
capital requirements.  This monitoring is the historical origin of bank examination and 
supervision. 
While bank coalitions in the U.S. were highly developed because of the industrial organization of 
the U.S. banking system, bank coalitions appear to be part of the banking histories of most 
countries, as we discuss below.  Sometimes coalitions were formal arrangements; sometimes they 
were informal arrangements.  Sometimes the coalitions were organized around a single dominant 
bank, such as the Suffolk Bank of pre-Civil War New England, J.P. Morgan in the 19
th century, or 
the Bank of Montreal in Canada.  Sometimes private banks formed a coalition with the 
government, as British banks often did with the Bank of England.  Not all these coalitions issued 
private money directly to the public, but all had features of coinsurance that correspond to 
liquidity creation. 
The extent to which coalitions were formed and were formalized is related to the frequency with 
which they were called upon to provide liquidity.  This likelihood is related to some other 
important facts about banking history.  In particular, historically, there is significant cross section 
variation in countries’ panic experiences.  Historical studies have led to a consensus that the cross 
section variation in panic experience is due to variation in the industrial organization of the 
banking system.  We review some of the evidence below.  Such evidence is important because it 
suggests that panics are not an inherent feature of banking per se, as is commonly supposed and 
asserted theoretically.  Our study is explicitly aimed at showing the importance of this industrial 
organization and its relation to the frequency of panics and bank failures.   
The model we analyze is simple.  There are two core assumptions.  First, there is asymmetric 
information between banks, who are better informed, and their depositors.  Second, banks may 
engage in moral hazard if their equity falls below a critical value.  These are fairly standard 
assumptions.  As one might expect, these assumptions lead depositors to sometimes want to 
withdraw their bank deposits.  Withdrawals may be inefficient because the bank may, in fact, be 
quite well off, but depositors do not know this.  We consider different organizational forms of the 




with many small independent unit banks.  Panics do not occur in all of these systems, though 
withdrawals do.  This is because the need for monitoring by depositors varies depending on the 
nature of the banking system, corresponding to economic history. 
There is a large existing literature on banking panics (See Gorton and Winton (2002) for a review 
of this literature).  The dominant view among theorists emanates from Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) who see banks as inherently unstable institutions prone to panics.  Our view is different.  It 
is closer to that of Calomiris and Kahn (1991) who also see panics as a monitoring device.  But, 
the critical feature of their model is that depositors, who produce private information about the 
bank run, get into line first to withdraw.  With first-come-first-served as the allocation rule, such 
information-producing depositors can cover the cost of their information production.  Thus 
Calomiris and Kahn explain the first-come-first-served rule.  But, this does not generate system 
wide panics, but rather runs on individual banks.  We do not assume a first-come-first-served 
rule. 
We show that a system of large, well-diversified, banks is more efficient than a system of many 
small, independent, unit banks.  A bank coalition can improve the efficiency of the system of 
small banks, but it cannot achieve the allocation provided by the system of large banks.  The 
government cannot improve upon either the coalition system or the system of large banks unless 
(i) the government is assumed to have much more power than private agents, e.g., it can seize 
bank assets; (ii) there are negative externalities that the banks or the coalition fail to internalize; 
or (iii) the government has access to resources outside the model.  It is difficult to find an 
economic rationale for the government to be the lender-of-last-resort, though see Gorton and 
Huang (2001). 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section II we very briefly review some of the historical and 
cross-country evidence on the performance of banking systems and the history of panics.  Our 
aim is to develop a set of stylized facts that a theory of panics and endogenous bank regulation 
should address.  In Section III we present a simple model of a banking system that is then 
analyzed in subsequent sections.  Our first step is to analyze two polar cases using the model.  
The first case is a banking system with small independent unit banks (Section IV) and the second 
is a system of large, well-diversified, branched banks (Section V).  Neither of these systems 
literally represents reality, though they come close to the experiences of some countries.  The 




clearinghouses were in existence, not all banks were members.
1  The system of large branched 
banks, the other polar case, does resemble many of the world’s banking systems, such as Canada.  
But, even these systems occasionally have problems that necessitate coalition formation, as we 
briefly discuss below.  In Section VI we consider the system with small independent unit banks 
that can form a coalition in the event of a banking panic.  Section VII concludes. 
II.  An Overview of the Historical and Cross Country Evidence 
Banking panic regularities are documented in a fairly large literature on the historical and 
international experience of banking panics, and we only briefly review it here.  Bordo (1985, 
1986), Calomiris and Gorton (1991), Calomiris (1993), Gorton and Winton (2001), and Gorton 
and Huang (2001) survey much of the literature. 
 
The most important empirical regularity is that the industrial organization of the banking industry 
is a critical determinant of the propensity for an economy to experience panics.  Banking panics 
are less likely to occur in banking systems in which there are a few relatively large, well-
branched, and well-diversified banks.  Surveying the international evidence, Calomiris (1993) 
cites industrial organization as the single most important factor explaining the incidence of 
panics.  This is also the conclusion of Bordo (1986) who studies the experiences of six countries 
(U.S., U.K., Canada, Sweden, Germany, and France) over the period 1870 to 1933.  Bordo (1985) 
concludes: “the United States experienced panics in a period when they were a historical curiosity 
in other countries” (p. 73).  See also Grossman (1994).  Studies of cross section variation within 
the United States lead to the same conclusion.  In particular, states that allowed branching 
experienced lower failure rates.  See Calomiris (1990, 1993), Bremer (1935) and White (1983, 
1984).  It is simply not the case panics are inherent to banking.  
 
A comparison of the U.S. and Canadian banking experiences from the middle of the 19
th century 
is a particularly instructive example of the importance of industrial organization in banking and 
its relation to central banking.  Haubrich (1990), Bordo, Rockoff, and Redish (1994, 1995), and 
White (1984), among others, study the drastic contrast between these two systems.  During the 
period 1870 to 1913, Canada had a branch banking system with about forty chartered banks, each 
extensively branched, while at the same time the United States had thousands of banks that could 
                                                 
1 Some banks were too far away to be members.  Rural banks and banks in smaller cities did not have formal 




not branch across state lines.  The U.S. experienced panics, while Canada did not.
2  There were 
high failure rates in the U.S. and low failure rates in Canada.  Thirteen Canadian banks failed 
from 1868 to 1889, while during the same period hundreds of bank failed in the U.S. (see the 
Comptroller of the Currency (1920)).   During the Great Depression, there were few bank failures 
in Canada, but the Canadian banking system did shrink by the about the same amount as in the 
U.S. (see White (1984)).  Overall, the Canadian banking system survived the Great Depression 
with few effects, while in the U.S., which had enacted the Federal Reserve Act in 1914, the 
banking system collapsed.  Canada’s central bank came into being in 1935, well after the Great 
Depression. 
 
A second apparent regularity concerning banking panics is that there is an important business 
cycle and, possibly, seasonal component to the timing of panics.  Panics come at or near business 
cycle peaks.  The interpretation is not that panics caused downturns.  There is not enough data to 
analyze that issue (at least, to date).  Rather, the idea is that depositors received information 
forecasting a recession and withdrew in an anticipation of the recession, a time when bank 
failures were more likely.  See Bordo (1986), Gorton (1988), Calomiris and Gorton (1991), and 
Donaldson (1992).  While the relation of panics to the business cycle will be incorporated into the 
model below, the “regularity” is somewhat fragile as there are few observations of panics.
3  
 
Associated with the likelihood of bank panics is the prevalence of private arrangements among 
banks.  In the U.S., for example, where panics were not infrequent, there was the development of 
the private clearinghouse system.  The U.S. clearinghouse system developed over the course of 
the 19
th century (see Andrew (1908b), Sprague (1910), Cannon (1910), Timberlake (1984), 
Gorton (1984, 1985), Gorton and Mullineaux (1987), Moen and Tallman (2000), and Wicker 
(2000), among others).  For purposes here the main point concerns the method clearinghouses 
developed to turn illiquid loan portfolios into money, private money that could be handed out to 
depositors in exchange for their demand deposits during times of panic.  During a banking panic 
member banks were allowed to apply to a clearinghouse committee, submitting assets as 
collateral in exchange for certificates.  If the committee approved the assets, then certificates 
                                                 
2 Calomiris and Gorton (1991) identify six panics in the United States prior to 1865, seven during the National Banking 
Era. 
3 Some have argued that there is also a seasonal factor in panics.  The seasonal factor in the timing of panics is noted 
by Andrew (1907), Kemmerer (1910), Miron (1986), Donaldson (1992), and Calomiris and Gorton (1991), among 
others.  But, Wicker (2000), for example, disputes the evidence.  The seasonal factor seems less clear than the business 





would be issued only up to a percentage of the face value of the assets.  During the Panics of 
1873, 1893, and 1907 the clearinghouse loan certificate process were issued directly to the banks’ 
depositors, in exchange for demand deposits, in denominations corresponding to currency.
4   If 
the depositors would accept the certificates as money, then the banks’ illiquid loan portfolios 
would be directly monetized.  The loan certificates were the joint liability of the clearinghouse, 
not the individual bank.  In this way, a depositor who was fearful that his particular bank might 
fail was able to insure against this event by trading his claim on the individual bank for a claim on 
the portfolio of banks in the clearinghouse.  This was the origin of deposit insurance. 
Bank coalitions are also not unique to the United States.
5  There are many examples of bank 
coalitions forming on occasion in other countries as well (see Cannon (1908, 1910) for 
information on the clearinghouses of England, Canada, and Japan).  We mention a few examples.  
According to Bordo and Redish (1987)  “the Bank of Montreal (founded in 1817) emerged very 
early as the government’s bank performing many central bank functions.  The pattern of the Bank 
of Montreal (and earlier precursors like the Suffolk Bank in the U.S.) in which the bank coalition 
is centered on one large bank, is quite common.  Another common feature is the cooperation of a 
(perhaps, informal) coalition of banks with the government to rescue a bank in trouble or stem a 
panic.  For example, major Canadian banks joined with the Canadian government to rescue the 
Canadian Commercial Bank in March 1985.  (See Jayanti, Whyte, and Do (1993).)  Similarly, in 
Germany the Bankhaus Herstatt was closed June 26, 1974.  There was no statutory deposit 
insurance scheme in Germany, but the West German Federal Association of banks used $7.8 
million in insurance to cover the losses.  Germany is a developed capitalist country where deposit 
insurance is completely private, being provided by coalitions of private banks that developed 
following the Herstatt crisis of 1974.  See Beck (no date).  
The model below is developed to be consistent with these stylized facts. 
 
 
                                                 
4 The amount of private money issued during times of panic was substantial.  During the Panic of 1893 about $100 
million of clearinghouse hand-to-hand money was issued (2.5 percent of the money stock).  During the Panic of 1907, 
about $500 million was issued (4.5 percent of the money stock).  See Gorton (1985).   
5 The clearinghouse system was not the only private central bank-like institution in U.S. history.  Before the U.S. Civil 
War, coincident with the beginnings of the clearinghouse system, the Suffolk Bank of Massachusetts was the focal 
point of a clearing system and acted as a lender-of-last-resort during the Panic of 1837.  See Mullineaux (1987), 





III. The  Model 
There are three dates, 0, 1, and 2 in the model economy and two types of agents: 
consumers/depositors and bankers.  Bankers are unique in having the ability to locate risky 
investment opportunities.  Also, only banks can store endowments (i.e., provide the service of 
safekeeping). 
There is a continuum of bankers.  Each banker has capital β  and a measure one of potential 
depositors.  Each bank has access to a riskless storage technology and to a risky investment 
technology.  The fraction of the portfolio invested in the riskless storage technology is α ; this 
investment will be referred to as reserves.  The remaining fraction 1-α +β  is invested in the risky 
technology.  Investments in the risky projects have to be made at date 0, and the returns are 
realized at date 2.  The date 2 return to a risky project depends on the state of the economy, which 
is a random variable, realized at date 1.  The return to a unit (of endowment good) invested in the 
risky project is  r ~ ~ + π , that is, there is a systematic component,π~, and an idiosyncratic 
component, r ~, to the return.  So, the state of the macroeconomy is indicated by π~, while the 
bank’s individual prospects are indicated by  r ~.  We assume that π~ is uniformly distributed in the 






≡ .  The idiosyncratic return for a risky project,  r ~ , is uniformly distributed 






At date 1, information about the date 2 return is realized, but there is asymmetric information 
between bankers and depositors.  Depositors observe the realized state of the macroeconomy (π ), 
but they do not observe the realized state of their bank’s idiosyncratic return (r).  Each banker 
knows his own bank’s state (r), and observes the realizations of other banks’ idiosyncratic shocks 
at date 1.  Idiosyncratic shock realizations at date 1 are not verifiable among banks, but realized 
cash flows at date 2 are verifiable.  So, to be clear, banks cannot write contracts with other banks 
contingent on idiosyncratic shocks at date 1.  At date 0, we assume that banks’ choice of reserve 
level α  and the level of bank capital β , are observable and verifiable.   
There is a moral hazard problem in that bankers have an opportunity to engage in fraud at date 1.  
Fraud is socially wasteful.  If a banker engages in fraud, he gets a proportion f of the return (i.e. 




receive nothing.  Projects can be liquidated at date 1, yielding a constant return of Q, regardless of 
the state of the project. 
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where c0, c1 and c2  are consumptions at date 0, 1 and 2 respectively. ε 1 and ε 2 represent 
depositors’ preference for later consumption. We assume ε 2 > ε 1 >0, and they are both very small 
such that they can be ignored in the following analysis.  Depositors' utility function implies that 
they will always wait until date 2 to withdraw if they believe their deposits are safe. However, 
they will withdraw at date 1 if they anticipate that there is any chance that their bankers are going 
to engage in fraud.  Depositors deposit in a single bank.   
Finally, bankers are risk neutral and they get the entire surplus from investment.  
We assume the following: 
Assumption 1.  Q 1 M
2
H L > > +
π + π .  This assumption says that, ex ante, a risky project is more 
efficient than riskless storage, if there is no liquidation or fraud.  However, if liquidation or fraud 
happens, then a risky project is dominated by investment in riskless storage.  
Assumption 2. (1+β )(1− f)(π L+M) < 1.  This assumption assures that there is a potential moral 
hazard problem.  Suppose a banker invests all of his assets in the risky project, and the economy 
turns out to be in the worst possible state (π L) at date 1.  Consider the banker with the mean return 
π L+M.  If the banker engages in fraud, he will receive f(1+β )(π L+M).  If he does not engage in 
fraud, his payoff will be (1+β )(π L+ M)− 1.  The assumption that (1+β )(1− f)(π L+M) < 1 ensures 
that the banker has an incentive to engage in fraud.    
Assumption 3. π L > Q > f(π H+2M).   In words, there is a dead weight loss if liquidation or fraud 
occurs.  If fraud does not occur, then the value of a risky project is greater than the liquidation 
value, Q, even if the project is in the lowest possible state.  If fraud occurs, then the value of a 




Assumption 4. A risky project is indivisible when liquidation occurs. Although at date 0, a 
banker can choose how much to invest in a risky project, at date 1 all the assets in a risky project 
must be liquidated if liquidation occurs. 
Assumption 5.  (1+β )Q>1.  That is, if depositors withdraw from their bank at date 1, then their 
deposit contract can always be honored.  
Under these assumptions, a banker may have an incentive to engage in moral hazard in certain 
states of the world.  Depositors, however, are rational.  If they anticipate that the bankers are 
going to engage in fraud, they withdraw their deposits to prevent it.  Bankers can commit to not 
engage in moral hazard by holding reserves. The higher the level of reserves, the lower the 
probability that a bank run occurs.  However, ex post, if the state of the economy is good at date 
1, then it would have been better to have invested in risky projects.  The bankers' task at date 0 is 
to choose an optimal reserve level, α  (the fraction of bank assets held in the riskless storage 
technology).  This is the only choice variable.  The optimal reserve choice depends on whether 
bank branching is allowed and on the interaction between the bankers. We interpret branching 
restrictions and different interactions between the bankers as different banking systems. Below, 
we will solve the bankers’ optimization problem under the different organizations of the banking 
industry, examining the reserve level, banking stability, and social welfare under each system. 
The essential ingredients of the model are the information asymmetry and the moral hazard 
problem.  In particular, at date 1 each banker has private information about the idiosyncratic 
shock to his own bank.  Based on this information the banker may have an incentive to engage in 
fraud.  Depositors want to monitor banks to prevent this from happening, but have only one tool 
at their disposal: they can withdraw from the bank.  The assumed information structure is meant 
to capture an essential feature of banking, namely, that the value of bank assets is opaque.  See, 
e.g., Morgan (2000). 
The moral hazard problem in this model is fraud.  This is realistic as fraud has historically been 
the most common reason for bank failure.  See Comptroller of the Currency (1920, 1988a, 
1988b), Benston and Kaufman (1986).  The Comptroller of the Currency (1873), reporting on the 
Panic of 1873, wrote that all the bank failures during the panic were due to “the criminal 
mismanagement of their officers or to the neglect or violation of the national-bank act on the part 





The study found insider abuse in many of the failed and rehabilitated banks during their 
decline.  Insider abuse—e.g., self-dealing, undue dependence on the bank for income or 
services by a board member or shareholder, inappropriate transactions with affiliates, or 
unauthorized transactions by management—was a significant factor leading to failure in 35 
percent of the failed banks.  About a quarter of the banks with significant insider abuse also 
had significant problems involving material fraud.  (p. 9). 
  
For purposes of the model, it is important that there be a moral hazard problem, but it is not 
essential that the problem be fraud.  Any one of a number of moral hazard problems would 
suffice.  Fraud, however, is a realistic and significant problem. 
There are two functions of banks in the model economy.  First, banks are unique in being able to 
identify risky investment opportunities; consumers/depositors cannot find these opportunities.  
Second, banks can provide a claim, a demand deposit, which is consistent with the subsistence 
requirement of consumers.  Because of their utility functions, consumers need to be assured that 
their claim will be worth 1 unit and banks can satisfy this need.  Implicitly, individual banks can 
diversify to this extent.  Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) show that uninformed consumers/traders 
with uncertain consumption demands prefer to transfer wealth intertemporally with claims that 
are riskless.  Riskless claims are not subject to trading losses to informed traders if consumers 
need to consume at date 1 rather than date 2.  The realization of date 1 consumption needs forces 
these uninformed consumers to sell their claims on a market where they lose money to informed 
agents.  A better arrangement for these consumers could be claims on a diversified bank that are 
always worth 1 unit (i.e., so that there is no private information that informed traders could learn).  
We do not explicitly incorporate all this here.  Rather, in the model here the structure of 
preferences dictates the type of claim that banks will offer depositors: the bank must offer the 
right to withdraw deposits at face value at date 1, i.e., a demand deposit contract.  
We now turn to examining the functioning of the banking system when it is organized in different 
ways.  We consider three basic forms of organization, two polar cases and one intermediate case.  
The first case is a system of many small independent unit banks.  The next is a system of large, 
well-diversified banks, and the last is a system of small unit banks that can form a coalition in 
certain states of the world. 
IV.  The System of Independent Unit Banks 
The first banking system we examine is one in which there are many small, independent unit 




no branches and they do not interact with each other ex ante or ex post (they are independent).  
This system characterizes those periods of U.S. history, for example, where banks were not 
allowed to branch and where they did not form explicit or implicit coalitions.  We will call this 
banking system the “Unit Bank” system. 
Unit Banks are “small” in the following sense: 
Assumption 6. A banker in charge of a Unit Bank can only manage one risky project.  A banker 
cannot diversify the risk by dividing his asset portfolio into many risky projects. 
Implicitly, we imagine that banks are spatially separated so that risky projects have the 
idiosyncratic risk of the individual bank’s location.  The assumption also implies that at date 1, 
the project of a banker cannot be transferred to another bank.  A project becomes worthless when 
taken over by another bank/banker.  In other words, a project involves a relationship specific 
investment that cannot be transferred. 
We solve the bankers' optimization problem by backward induction.  First, given a Unit Bank's 
choice of reserve level, α , we characterize the states in which bankers will have incentives to 
engage in moral hazard and, hence, depositors will withdraw their deposits.  Second, we will 
calculate the bankers’ optimal choice of reserve level, α , at date 0. 
At date 1, depositors receive the signal about the state of the macroeconomy, π;  they expect that 
the return to their bank's risky project is π  +E(r).  Based on the state of the macroeconomy they 
infer whether their banker has an incentive to engage in fraud. 
Depositors do not observe the realization of their bank’s idiosyncratic shock, r.  Because of their 
utility functions they do not care about the likelihood of their bank engaging in fraud, but only in 
whether there is any chance of this occurring.  They, therefore, assume that r=0 and check 
whether their banker has an incentive to engage in fraud.  This leads to: 
Lemma 1: At date 1, given a banker’s reserve level α  and the realized state of the economy π , if 





, then there is a positive probability that bankers will engage in fraud.  If  









Proof: Suppose the banker has reserves of α  and the realized idiosyncratic shock is r=0. The 
realized state of the macroeconomy is π .  If the banker does not engage in fraud, his payoff will 
be π (1+β -α )+α -1.  If he engages in fraud his payoff will be π f(1+β -α ), since he cannot steal 
anything from the reserves.  If  π f(1+β -α )>π (1+β -α )+α -1, or 




1 , the banker 
engages in fraud. Otherwise he has no incentive to engage in fraud.  // 
Lemma 1 illustrates the viewpoint of depositors who do not know r, the realization of the 
idiosyncratic component of the return.  They observe the state of the macroeconomy, π , and can 
calculate whether, given that state, there is a chance that bankers will engage in moral hazard.  
Because their utility functions are kinked and they will get minus infinity if consumption is less 
than one, depositors do not care about the likelihood of moral hazard occurring, but rather 
whether there is any chance of moral hazard occurring. 
If depositors find that there is a chance that bankers will engage in fraud (i.e. 





then they withdraw all their savings.  Since all the depositors receive the same macroeconomic 
information and all the banks are, form their viewpoint, homogeneous, if one bank suffers from a 
run, there are runs on all the other banks.  Therefore, a panic occurs.  
Lemma 2: At date 1, given the banker's reserve α  and the realized state of the economy π , if 




1 , then a banking panic occurs. 
Note that the panic is defined by two characteristics of date 1 actions.   First, depositors cannot 
distinguish between banks because of the lack of bank-specific information and so, if they choose 
to withdraw at date 1, they withdraw from all banks.  Second, this causes all the banks to be 
liquidated, which in this model we can think of as failure since the banks go out of existence 
prematurely.  In terms of the model, we emphasize this with the following definition. 
Definition: A banking panic is a date 1 event in which depositors at all banks seek to withdraw 
their deposits and banks cannot honor these demands, resulting in a suspension of convertibility 
and the liquidation of at least some banks. 
Note, for future reference, that if all depositors seek to withdraw their deposits at date 1, but their 
requests can be honored without suspension or liquidations of banks, then we do not deem this 




At date 0, anticipating what will happen in different states of the world at date 1, bankers choose 
the optimal reserve level to maximize their expected payoff.  One the one hand, bankers want to 
maximize investment in the risky projects because this is more profitable, but on the other hand, 
they want to avoid being prematurely liquidated in a banking panic at date 1.  According to 
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, if bankers hold reserves such that 
L ) f 1 ( 1
L ) f 1 )( 1 ( 1 U
max π − −
π − β + −
≡ α ≥ α ,  then 
they have no incentive to engage in the moral hazard, even if the economy is in the lowest state.  
Therefore, bankers solve the following optimization problem at date 0:  
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The solution to the bankers’ date 0 problem is characterized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: There exists a unique optimal reserve level ] U
max , 0 [ α ∈ α  that solves the bankers' 
optimization problem.  Define:  ]
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The following corollary is clear from Proposition 1. 
 
Corollary 1:  The optimal α
U is decreasing in bankers' capital β . 
The purpose of a panic is to monitor the bankers, to prevent them from engaging in fraud.  The 
panic is not irrational; it is not motivated by externalities due to actions of other depositors when 
there is a sequential service constraint.  Rather, the panic is related to the macroeconomy, which 
may create incentives for bankers to engage in moral hazard.  The fear of not being able to satisfy 
subsistence should the banker engage in moral hazard, a kind of extreme risk aversion, causes the 
depositors’ withdrawals.  However, not all bankers will engage in moral hazard.  The problem is 
that depositors do not know which bankers have high idiosyncratic shock realizations and which 
have low idiosyncratic shock realizations.  Depositors liquidate all banks.  Because of this 
possibility, bankers hold high reserve levels, but this is inefficient. 
V.  The Big Bank System 
At the other extreme from a banking system composed of many independent unit banks is a 
system where banks are large and heavily branched.  We call this the “Big Bank” system.  Most 
banking systems in the world are closer to this system than to the system of independent unit 
banks, discussed above.   
Definition: A Big Bank is a bank with a portfolio of assets that has a realized return of π  + M at 
date 1.  
So, a Big Bank’s return is the systematic return plus the diversified idiosyncratic mean return, M.  
This is the essential point, namely, that the idiosyncratic risk is diversified away, implicitly by 
virtue of the bank’s size via branching.  Consequently, at date 1, when the state of the economy is 
revealed, the return to a Big Bank's risky projects is also known. The state of macroeconomy is 
sufficient information for assessing the state of a Big Bank.  As a result, depositors know for sure 
whether a Big Bank is going to engage in moral hazard or not.  If they anticipate that their Big 
Bank will engage in fraud, they run on the Big Bank.  Otherwise they wait until date 2 to 
withdraw. 




Big Banks invest in a portfolio of projects, implicitly each being run by a branch manager.  The 
Big Bank makes decisions about this portfolio of projects and, in particular, has the flexibility to 
liquidate individual projects and to engage in fraud at the level of these projects. 
We solve the representative Big Bank’s problem in two steps.  First, we begin by treating the 
bank by analogy with the system of independent unit banks.  That is, we assume that a measure of 
such small banks can get together at date 0 and form a Big Bank.  We determine when such a 
bank would face a bank run at date 1 and then determine the optimal reserve level chosen by this 
bank at date 0.  We will draw some conclusions at this point.  Then the second step of the analysis 
recognizes that a Big Bank can alter its portfolio at date 1, liquidating some projects while letting 
the other projects continue.  So, the second step of the analysis takes this into account. 
We proceed as above and solve the Big Bank's optimization problem using backward induction.  
First, given the Big Bank's choice of reserve level, we characterize the states in which a bank run 
occurs.  Comparing the banker’s incentives, as above, leads to: 
Lemma 3: At date 1, given the Big Bank's reserve level, α,  and the realized state of the economy 
π , if 





M , the Big Bank will engage in fraud and therefore depositors will run 
on the Big Bank.  If 





M , the Big Bank has no incentive to engage in fraud and 
depositors will not run the bank.  
At date 0, anticipating what will happen in different states of the world at date 1, a Big Bank 
chooses its optimal reserve level to maximize its expected payoff.  If a Big Bank holds reserves 
such that 
) M L )( f 1 ( 1
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max + π − −
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≡ α ≥ α ,  then it has no incentive to engage in moral hazard 
even if the economy is in the lowest state. A Big Bank solves the following optimization problem 
at date 0:  
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The solution is given in: 
Proposition 2: There is a unique optimal  ] , 0 [ max
B α α ∈  that solves the Big Banks' optimization 
problem.  Define  ]
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The optimal α
B is decreasing in bankers' capital β . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
As mentioned at the outset of this section, Big Banks have another tool at their disposal that has 
not been taken into account yet.  Big Banks have the flexibility to partially liquidate their 
portfolios at date 1.  In fact, a Big Bank only needs to liquidate some of the risky projects when a 
bank run occurs.  Recall that liquidation (and fraud) can occur at the project level.  In order to 
deal with depositors’ withdrawals at date 1, a Big Bank only needs to liquidate a fraction x of the 
risky projects such that α  +(1+β−α) xQ is equal to 1.  Actually, however, a Big Bank can do even 
better if it can commit to not engage in fraud by liquidating some of the projects and holding the 
proceeds as additional reserves.  Although the risky projects have idiosyncratic returns, they have 
the same liquidation value Q.  Suppose the Big Bank is to liquidate a fraction x of the risky 
projects.  It should liquidate optimally, as follows.  It will liquidate those projects that have 
realized idiosyncratic returns, r, in the interval  [0, x2M].  The remaining (1-x) fraction of projects 
has realized idiosyncratic returns r in the complementary interval: [x2M, 2M].  The average 
return on the remaining, i.e., nonliquidated, (1-x) fraction of projects is 
M ) x 1 (
2
M 2 M 2 x
+ + π =
+
+ π .  If the Big Bank allows the remaining projects to continue 




Big Bank engages in fraud on the remaining projects, its payoff will be f(1+β−α) (1-
x)( π + (1+ x )Μ).   Therefore, the Big Bank has to liquidate a fraction x of the risky projects such 
that: α  +(1+β−α) xQ + (1+β−α) (1-x)( π + (1+  x )Μ)  -1 ≥   f (1+β−α)  (1-x)( π + (1+  x )Μ).   The 
optimal x is the solution to the following problem: 
Max x α  +(1+β−α) xQ + (1+β−α)  (1-x)( π + (1+  x )Μ)  -1 
s.t. (1+β−α) (1-x)( π + (1+  x )Μ)  -1 ≥   f (1+β−α)  (1-x)( π + (1+  x )Μ) 
          x ∈ [0,1]. 
The solution is given by: 
Lemma 4: There is a unique  ] 1 , 0 [ x∈ that solves the above problem. The unique solution is: 
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 Moreover, x is decreasing in α,  β   and π.  
Proof:  See Appendix. 
Now the Big Bank’s problem at date 0 can be written as:  
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Proposition 3: The above objective function is strictly concave in α.   There is a unique optimal 
reserve level, ] , 0 [ max
B α α ∈ , that solves the big bank's optimization problem.  
Proof: See Appendix. 
To emphasize, note that in the Big Bank system banks may experience withdrawals at date 1, but 
they do not fail, i.e., they are not liquidated.  In the model there is no difference between the bank 
liquidating projects and holding the proceeds as reserves and withdrawals.  In other words, the 
Big Bank system can be viewed as experiencing deposit withdrawals, but there are no bank runs 
or failures. The Big Bank system does not experience banking panics.  The independent unit 
banks have bank runs, and failures, because each unit bank’s project is indivisible when 
liquidation occurs. 
There is no closed form solution for the representative Big Bank’s choice of α  at date 0 when it 
has the flexibility to choose which projects to liquidate at date 1.  But, it is clear that the system 
with flexibility is even more efficient than the Big Bank system without this flexibility.  (A 
portfolio of options is more valuable than an option on a portfolio.) 
In broad outlines, the distinction between the Big Bank system and the system of small 
independent Unit Banks corresponds to the difference between the Canadian and U.S. systems.   
As mentioned above, the Canadian system generally displayed fewer failures and no panics.  In 
addition, as the table below makes clear, Canadian banks held fewer reserves (in the form of 




Table: Bank Balance Sheet Items for Canada and the U.S., 1870-1919 
  1870-79 1880-89 1890-99 1900-09 1910-19 
 Canada 
Loan/Assets  0.717 0.706 0.696 0.722 0.640 
Securities/Assets  0.013 0.021 0.071 0.087 0.110 
Debt/Equity  1.458 1.914 2.796 4.232 6.876 
 United  States 
Loan/Assets  0.487 0.563 0.589 0.546 0.567 
Securities/Assets  0.253 0.169 0.117 0.164 0.168 
Debt/Equity  1.826 2.334 2.620 4.184 5.352 
 
Source: Table 4 of Bordo, Redish, and Rockoff (1995) (based on U.S. Comptroller of the 
Currency, Annual Reports, and Curtis (1931)). 
 
After 1920, the comparison is also stark.  By 1920 the private clearinghouse system in the U.S. 
that functioned as a lender-of-last-resort was gone, having been replaced by the Federal Reserve 
System.  In Canada, the bank merge movement, from 1900 to 1925, reduced the number of banks 
and resulted in a small number of banks with large branch networks.  Prior to the merger 
movement, Canadian banks were branched, but there were many more banks.  The post-merger 
movement banking system in Canada is clearly the Big Bank system.  The comparison between 
the two systems during this period is the subject of Bordo, Rockoff, and Redish (1994), quoted 
above, who emphasize the fact that between 1920 and 1980 there was one bank failure in Canada, 
in contrast to hundreds and thousands in the U.S., particularly during the Great Depression.  
There were no banking panics in Canada, though the reduction in deposits during the Great 
Depression was of similar magnitude, as noted above.  
VI. Bank  Coalitions 
The above sections analyzed two polar case banking systems.  Arguably, there are banking 
systems that resemble the Unit Banking system or the system of Big Banks, but as discussed 
above, historically bank coalitions have almost always been present in some form.  The above 




benchmarks.  In this section, we introduce the possibility of a bank coalition, i.e., a state 
contingent agreement between banks.  The discussion of bank coalitions will follow the U.S. 
clearinghouse experience, briefly described above, but the argument is more general, as discussed 
below. 
The basic idea for the coalition is as follows.  The failure of individual small Unit Banks as a 
result of bank runs at date 1, despite holding high levels of reserves, can be improved upon if the 
small banks can replicate, at least partially, the performance of a Big Bank.  Big Banks are 
diversified and so face different incentives to engage in moral hazard.  In particular, Big Banks 
can liquidate part of their portfolio, in the face of withdrawals, and increase their reserves.  For 
small banks to attempt to replicate the performance of a Big Bank, a certain level of 
diversification must be achieved.  Then, at date 1, if there is a bank panic, coalition members can 
then credibly form a Big Bank by combining their assets and liabilities.   
Credibility of the coalition is established by a signal of coalition solvency; the signal is the 
coalition’s act of issuing claims to depositors in exchange for individual bank deposits.  These 
claims, the loan certificates, are supported by a sharing rule that combines assets and liabilities at 
date 1 and which provides incentives for the member banks with high idiosyncratic shock 
realizations to monitor member banks with low idiosyncratic shock realizations.  “Monitoring” 
means preventing member banks from engaging in moral hazard, by liquidating these banks or 
subsidizing them.  The internal workings of the coalition are not observable to depositors, so they 
will not accept the loan certificates unless they believe that the coalition’s behavior will, in fact, 
be as described above.  In equilibrium depositors’ beliefs will be consistent with the behavior of 
the coalition.  We now turn to providing the details. 
A.  The Setting With Bank Coalitions 
Suppose that there are small independent Unit Banks at date 0.  They are prohibited from forming 
a Big Bank.  (For example, banks are prohibited from branching across state lines.)  Without 
forming a Big Bank, however, these small Unit Banks can decide to form a coalition at date 0 and 
the coalition partially replicates the Big Bank in certain states of the world at date 1.  The 
coalition will be a rule indicating that some banks are to be liquidated and a sharing rule for the 
remaining banks.  At date 0, Unit Banks can get together to form a coalition and reach an 
agreement about their individual capital and reserve levels.  Because the idiosyncratic shocks are 
not verifiable, and thus not contractible, the coalition has no power to force its members to 




requirement to become a member of the coalition at date 0 is to hold the required reserve level 
(and capital level).  At date 1 the depositors cannot observe whether the rules have been carried 
out or not.  They can only observe whether the coalition liquidates some of the member banks and 
combines the assets and liabilities of the remaining member banks.   
The sequence of events at date 1 begins with depositors observing the realized state of the 
macroeconomy and deciding whether to withdraw their deposits or not.  Then the banks decide 
whether to trigger the operation of the coalition.  (Subsequent subgames are explained below.)  
We define the coalition and the operation of the coalition as follows: 
Definition:  The bank coalition  is an agreement between member banks at date 0 about the 
following issues: 
(i)  Bank reserve levels, α , at date 0. 
(ii)  A date 1 state-contingent rule, P(α, π ),  indicating when the coalition is to operate 
(P=1) or not operate (P=0), in which case banks act as Unit Banks.  (The 
contingency, in fact, will be a panic; this is shown below in Lemma 4.) 
(iii)  If the coalition is set into operation, then the coalition applies two rules: a liquidation 
rule and a debt transfer rule.  The first rule, L(α, π , r), is a mapping from [0, 2M] to 
{1, 0}, indicating whether a member bank (in state {α, π } )  with idiosyncratic shock r 
is to be liquidated (L=1) or not liquidated (L=0).   If the member is not liquidated, 
then the second rule applies.  That rule, D(α, π , r), is a mapping from [0, 2M] to R
+, 
indicating the liability reallocated to a member bank with idiosyncratic shock r. 
If at date 1 the coalition is set into operation, then depositors observe that the coalition suspends 
convertibility in all banks.  The coalition pools the liabilities of nonliquidated banks and issues 
loan certificates, which are debt claims to the coalition, backed by all the assets of all the member 
banks.  Depostiors also observe that the coalition liquidates some of the member banks. 
Suppose that at date 1 the state of the world is such that the coalition operates.  The issue of loan 
certificates and suspension of convertibility signal this to depositors.  Then the coalition first 
applies the liquidation rule, ending the projects of some member banks.   According to the second 
rule, all the non-liquidated members pool their liabilities together.  A member bank with 




verifiable, D is verifiable at date 2.
6  The liability D(α, π , r) indicates how much of the coalition’s 
debt, the individual bank with idiosyncratic shock r is responsible for at date 2. 
At date 2 the coalition has a budget constraint:  1 ) r ( dF r   , D( NL ≥ )   , π α ∫ , where FNL(r) is the 
distribution function of the non-liquidated banks’ idiosyncratic shocks.  If a member bank cannot 
honor its liability to the coalition, all the member banks that are solvent share the default amount.  
At date 2, if the coalition is solvent, all the solvent bankers receive what remains after they honor 
their individual liabilities, and honor their shared part of other members’ default liabilities.  If the 
coalition is insolvent, none of the member banks can be solvent.  Consequently only those 
bankers who engaged in fraud get the payoff from fraud. 
If the coalition does not operate, each member bank acts as an independent bank and deals with 
its own depositors’ withdrawal demands.  
The operation of the coalition is intended to achieve two goals. First, by liquidating some of the 
member banks the coalition tries to inform depositors that the non-liquidated banks are in 
relatively more sound states. This partially alleviates the panic caused by the asymmetric 
information between the banks and depositors. Second, by pooling the liabilities the coalition 
tries to convince depositors that incentives to engage in fraud can be removed by monitoring and 
coinsurance among the remaining banks.  Whether the coalition is successful in achieving these 
goals will depend upon the beliefs of the depositors. 
Before we study the equilibrium, we specify the following assumptions about the coalition. 
Assumption 8: If a bank does not join the coalition at date 0, it cannot apply for membership at 
date 1. 
This means that if a bank does not join the coalition at date 0, it acts as an independent Unit Bank.  
The purpose of this assumption is to save the complicated analysis of transactions between the 
coalition and non-members in different states at date 1. 
Assumption 9: The identity of the date 0 coalition members, and the coalition itself, is 
observable at all dates.   
                                                 
6 Moreover, the coalition needs to prevent member banks revealing their r by showing depositors their 
D(α, π , r).  We can imagine that the coalition takes out a note “You owe the coalition D(α, π , r)” and asks 
the banker for his signature. In this way, only the coalition holds the verifiable contracts, which specify all 




This assumption has two implications. First, if a bank quits the coalition at date 1, then its 
depositors know that it is no longer a member of the coalition.  Second, if a group of banks quit 
the original coalition and form another coalition, then depositors can distinguish the deviating 
coalition from the original coalition.  (This assumption is for simplicity.) 
Assumption 10: At date 1, bank coalition members learn the realizations of other members’ 
idiosyncratic shocks, r. 
Bank coalitions were involved in clearing each other’s liabilities and this is one mechanism 
through which information about other members’ states of the world was acquired historically.  In 
addition, the coalition can require that information be reported to the coalition.  As discussed 
above, the clearinghouse required that certain information be reported and sent bank examiners to 
monitor members’ conditions. 
Assumption 11: The coalition maximizes the total payoffs to its member banks.   
For simplicity, we do not go into the details how decisions are made inside the coalition.  We 
assume that the internal organization of the coalition is equivalent to assuming the existence of a 
coalition decision maker who is independent of any of the member banks and maximizes the total 
payoffs to all member banks.
7 
Assumption 12: When a banker joins the coalition, property rights in his bank are maintained, 
that is, he cannot be forced to operate his bank in a certain way, nor can he be involuntarily 
separated from his bank’s assets. 
Banks are private firms.  Joining the coalition at date 0 does not change this.  The intent of this 
assumption is to emphasize that while the coalition can liquidate member banks, it can only do so 
if the banker who owns the bank agrees.  If a member bank is not liquidated, then the banks’ 
original owners must operate banks that are not liquidated.  Under this assumption, non-
liquidated good banks need to bribe/subsidize non-liquidated bad banks to keep them in the 
coalition, so that they do not engage in fraud.  This restricts the coalition’s sharing rules because 
each banker has to be promised a payoff at least equal to the value to him from deviating and 
engaging in fraud.  Otherwise the coalition would have more freedom to set the sharing rules 
because in order to make member banks accept the rules it only needs to threaten to drive them 
                                                 
7 We take the basic features of the coalition, such as its objective function, as exogenous, and do not 
investigate how the coalition comes into being or whether other types of coalitions would be superior in 




out of the coalition.  Keep in mind that the project of a banker about to engage in fraud cannot be 
transferred to another bank since, by assumption, bankers can only manage a single project.  In 
other words, we have assumed that a project becomes worthless when taken over by another 
bank/banker.  A project’s value depends on a relationship specific investment that cannot be 
transferred. 
B.  Equilibrium with Bank Coalitions 
The sequence of events begins at date 1 with depositors observing the state of the macroeconomy 
and deciding whether to withdraw or not.  To simplify the exposition of the equilibrium we will 
start at this node of the game and then go on to the remaining subgames.   This first decision of 
depositors is the decision to panic or not, and so deserves attention.   
At date 1, each member bank of the coalition holds reserves of α  when the state of the economy π  
is realized.  If 





, then even the bank with the lowest idiosyncratic shock (i.e., 
r=0) has no incentive to engage in fraud.  Hence there is no need for depositors to run the banks.  
If 





, then some banks have an incentive to engage in fraud.  We first show 
that without a bank panic, banks have no incentives to pool their liabilities.  
Lemma 4: The coalition will not operate at date 1 if depositors do not panic. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The lemma says that if there is no panic no bank coalition will operate.  Banks will behave as 
Unit Banks.  Because the rules of the coalition, adopted at date 0, are not binding, banks are free 
to deviate from those rules.  They can, in principle, adopt any set of rules concerning transfers 
among members (as long as such rules satisfy the budget constraint for the coalition).  The lemma 
says that any such set of transfers is dominated by banks acting as Unit Banks. 
The banking panic creates an externality for banks that would not engage in the moral hazard 
problem, the “good” banks.  If these good banks did not face the panic, they would have no 
incentive to monitor the banks that are going to engage in fraud, the “bad” banks.  Because 
depositors cannot distinguish good banks from bad banks, all banks face the prospect of being 




Depositors anticipate that if they do not run the banks, the coalition will not do anything to 
prevent member banks from engaging in fraud. So, they run all banks if and only if 





. Once the depositors run the banks, the coalition has to operate to convince 
the depositors that it can remove the incentives to engage in fraud from some of its member banks 
and therefore there is no need to liquidate those banks. 
We now turn to the subgames following the depositors’ panic decision.  We define a coalition 
equilibrium in the face of a panic as follows: 
Definition: When there is a bank panic, a coalition equilibrium consists of the strategies and 
beliefs of the various agents in the economy as follows: 
1. To maximize the total payoff to all member banks, the coalition suspends convertibility and 
issues loan certificates.  It then applies the liquidation rule by announcing which banks are 
liquidated, and applies the debt transfer rule by reallocating liabilities to the remaining banks.  
2. Each member bank maximizes its payoff by choosing whether to accept the coalition’s rules or 
to quit the coalition.  
3. Depositors observe: (i) the measure of banks liquidated by the coalition; (ii) which member 
banks quit the coalition; and  (iii), which members remain in the coalition.  Based on what 
they observe, they update their beliefs.  On the equilibrium path, their beliefs are updated 
based on Bayes’ rule and the strategies taken by the coalition and its member banks.  Off the 
equilibrium path, their beliefs have to be consistent with Bayes’ rule and the strategies of the 
coalition and its members.  If their bank is liquidated by the coalition, then their deposits are 
paid off at date 1.
8  If their bank is not liquidated, they need to decide whether to accept the 
loan certificates in exchange for demand deposits.  If depositors believe their deposits are safe, 
they always withdraw at date 2.  Otherwise they withdraw at date 1. 
4. Non-liquidated banks decide whether to engage in fraud.  
Based on the definition, the following proposition gives the coalition equilibrium in the face of a 
bank panic at date 1.  
                                                 
8 This is for simplicity.  The alternative requires the liabilities of the liquidated banks to be honored by the 




Proposition 4: Suppose that at date 1 
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equilibrium: 
1) The coalition operates; it issues loan certificates; P(α ,π ) =1 . Then the coalition applies the 
liquidation rule, setting L(α, π , r)= 1 (i.e., liquidation) for banks with idiosyncratic shocks r∈  [0, 
x*(α, π )2M] and pays these bankers α +(1+β -α )Q-1. For banks that are not liquidated, the 
complementary set, the coalition reallocates liabilities according to the members type, r: D(α, π , 
r)= α  +(1-f)(1+β−α)(π +r);  
 2) No member bank quits the coalition; 
3) Depositors believe that: (i) the coalition has liquidated the banks with idiosyncratic shocks in 
the interval: [0, x*(α,π )2M]; (ii) remaining member banks have idiosyncratic shocks distributed 
in the interval: [x*(α,π )2M, 2M]; and (iii), none of the non-liquidated member banks have 
incentives to engage in fraud. They liquidate any bank that quits the coalition and accept loan 
certificates issued by the coalition;   
4) None of the member banks engage in fraud;  
5) Off equilibrium path beliefs are as follows.  If depositors observe a fraction y of banks quit the 
coalition, a fraction z of the banks remain non-liquidated in the coalition and a fraction 1-y-z of 
banks are liquidated by the coalition, then they believe that the idiosyncratic shocks of those 
banks out of the coalition are distributed in the interval: [0, y2M], and that the idiosyncratic 
shocks of those non-liquidated banks in the coalition are distributed in the interval: [(1-z)2M, 
2M]. They liquidate all the banks out of the coalition, and accept the loan certificates if and only 
if 1-z≥  x*(α, π ). 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The proposition shows how the coalition behaves as a lender-of-last-resort by monitoring and by 
providing insurance.
9  Monitoring corresponds to liquidating bad banks, those with the worst 
                                                 
9 As is well known, in these types of models there are many (sunspot) equilibria, corresponding to other 
possible beliefs off the equilibrium path.  This indeterminacy can be eliminated along the lines of Goldstein 




idiosyncratic shock realizations.  Member banks of type r∈  [0, x*(α, π )2M] are liquidated.  These 
banks would have engaged in fraud.  The insurance comes from the transfers implemented among 
the non-liquidated banks.  Member banks of type r∈ [x*(α,π )2M, 2M] are not liquidated, but are 
assigned new debt obligations according to  D(α, π , r)= α  +(1-f)(1+β−α)(π +r).  Their original 
debt, i.e., face value of the demand deposits, was one.  Note that banks with 
π −
α − β + −
α −
<
) 1 )( f 1 (
1
r  have their debt reduced, i.e., D(α, π , r)<1, so these banks are subsidized to 
entice them not to engage in fraud.  This is efficient because their projects are worth more if they 
are continued, as long as they do not engage in fraud.  Member banks with  π −
α − β + −
α −
>
) 1 )( f 1 (
1
r  
have their debt increased, i.e., D(α, π , r)>1, so these banks are being taxed to pay the subsidy to 
the low r banks.  Banks with high idiosyncratic shock realizations cannot be taxed too much, or 
they will engage in fraud.  The transfers of the debt obligations must satisfy the budget constraint 
that ∫ = π α
M 2
* x 1 ) r ~ ( dF ) r , , ( D .  This budget constraint limits how much insurance the coalition can 
provide and, therefore, determines the point at which member banks are liquidated. 
Note that when the state of the economy is low and depositors run the banks, the number 
(measure) of member banks that the coalition has to liquidate depends on the state of the 
economy.  When  





M , there is no need for the coalition to liquidate any 
member banks.  When 





M 2 , all the member banks have to be liquidated.  
(Note that since depositors can observe π  and α , the coalition cannot pretend that it is not in a 
state where all members should be liquidated).  When  M 2
- f
1
M + π ≤
) α β + )(1 − (1
α −
< + π , the 
coalition needs to liquidate some of the member banks. 
There is a critical difference between how the coalition and the Big Bank deal with panics.  The 
difference has to do with the difference between the ownership and property rights in these two 
systems.  The banker of a Big Bank (implicitly) hires branch managers to manage branches for 
him, and he gets the entire surplus.  We do not need to consider the branch managers’ incentives 
because the branch manager has no property rights over his branch.  Consequently, when a Big 
Bank closes a branch, it gets α+(1+β−α) Q-1 after paying off the branch depositors and uses this 
                                                                                                                                                 




amount as additional reserves. These additional reserves change the incentives of the Big Bank.  
But, the coalition cannot increase reserves in this way because member banks have the property 
rights and hence control of their assets; they are free to quit the coalition.  In order to entice them 
not to engage in fraud they must be rewarded.  The payoff to a deviating bank is α+(1+β−α) Q-1, 
which is (weakly) dominated by the payoff it can get if it stays in the coalition. 
At date 0, each bank must decide whether to join the coalition and the coalition must determine 
the optimal reserve level α.    The optimal reserve for the coalition is the solution of the following 
problem: 
Max α  
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Proposition 5: The coalition’s objective function is strictly concave in α.   There is a unique 
optimal reserve level, ] U
max , 0 [ α ∈ α , that solves the coalition's optimization problem. At date 0, 
every bank strictly prefers to join the coalition. 
 Proof: See Appendix. 
Intuitively, it is clear why each bank strictly prefers to join coalition.  Joining the coalition is a 
verifiable act at date 0.  The bank holds the specified level of reserves and capital and the 
coalition announces that the bank is a member.  If the bank does not join the coalition at date 0, 
then it cannot join the coalition at date 1.   If a bank is not in the coalition it is an independent 
Unit Bank and the proposition shows that this bank has lower expected profits than a coalition 
member. 





The coalition system is an intermediate case between the Unit Bank system and the Big Bank 
system.  The similarity between the coalition system and the independent Unit Bank system is 
that we may observe bank failures (i.e., liquidations) when the economy is in a bad state.  The 
similarity between the coalition system and the Big Bank system is that the coalition can monitor 
and insure member banks when the economy is in a bad state, while the Big Bank “monitors” 
itself by closing branches. The one unique feature associated with the coalition is that when a 
panic occurs, it suspends convertibility and issues certificates. This feature is important because it 
is a commitment made to depositors that the non-liquidated member banks will not engage in 
fraud and it provides incentives for member banks to monitor and insure each other. The role of 
suspension of convertibility here is quite different from a coordination device used to eliminate 
Pareto-dominant equilibria in other models (e.g. Diamond and Dybvig (1983)).  
C.  Comparing the Different Bank Systems 
We have studied three different banking systems: the independent Unit Banking system, the Big 
Bank system, and the bank coalition.  In this section, we compare these systems in terms of 
welfare.  Keep in mind that, on the one hand, holding reserves is inefficient because the risky 
project earns a higher return.  But, on the other hand, holding fewer reserves means a higher 
chance of a bank panic, or of withdrawals in the case of the Big Bank system. 
We first compare the optimal reserve levels and the likelihood of withdrawals under the different 
banking systems.  
Proposition 6: The Unit Banking system holds more reserves than the coalition system, which, in 
turn, holds more reserves than the Big Bank system.  Consequently, withdrawals are most likely 
in the Big Bank system, followed by the coalition system, and finally by the independent Unit 
Banking system. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
In the Unit Banking system, if depositors monitor banks by withdrawing, then the bank panic 
results in all banks being liquidated.  Unit Banks are not diversified, nor do they have (private) 
deposit insurance like the coalition system.  Banks in the Unit Banking system try to avoid the ex 
post losses from panics by holding more reserves.  Banks in the Big Bank system can liquidate 
part of their assets to make a commitment that fraud is not going to happen. By closing some of 
the branches, the remaining projects can survive until date 2. Therefore, Big Banks invest more in 




system and the Big Bank system. State contingent monitoring and co-insurance provide banks in 
the coalition with a way to survive panics if they are solvent. However, because the coalition 
system cannot completely replicate the Big Bank, banks in the coalition still hold more reserves 
than banks in the Big Bank system. 
Proposition 6 leads to the important conclusion that there are more bank panics under the 
coalition system than under either of the other two organizational forms.  Big Banks do not face 
panics.  Though depositors’ withdrawals are the largest if they do monitor at date 1, Big Banks do 
not suspend convertibility, nor are they liquidated.  In this sense, there is no panic. Unit Banks 
hold high reserves to reduce the likelihood of a date 1 panic.  Banks in the coalition system hold 
fewer reserves than Unit Banks, but fewer banks are liquidated if there is a panic.  Thus, the 
incidence of bank panics is a function of the organization of the banking system. 
With respect to efficiency:   
Proposition 7: The Big Bank system is more efficient than the coalition system, which is more 
efficient than the independent Unit Banking system. 
Proof: See Appendix.  
The Big Bank has two advantages.  Unlike a Unit Bank, it is diversified, so the information 
asymmetry is eliminated.  And second, it can close branches and use the proceeds as reserves to 
alter its incentives to engage in fraud.  The coalition is diversified in the sense that the 
membership’s aggregate portfolio is diversified, but property rights in the coalition do not allow it 
to close member banks and use the proceeds as reserves for the remaining members.   
Proposition 7 ranks the various banking systems in terms of welfare.  Proposition 6 provides 
empirical predictions about banking system stability, that is failure or liquidation of banks.  To 
illustrate the comparison of different banking systems, we present a numerical example.  The 




Comparative Banking Systems: A Numerical Example 
Assumed Parameters: π L=1.0, π H=1.6, β =0.35, Q=0.75, f=0.4, M=0.06. 
  Unit Banks  Coalition  Big Banks 
Reserve Level Required for No Date 1 
Withdrawals 
U
max α =0.65  
B
max α =0.60  
U
max α =0.65  




Bank Failures if Panic  All Banks  Some Banks  No Banks 
Likelihood of Withdrawal at Date 1  0.2   0.36   0.41  





The last row of the table confirms that the Big Bank system is the most efficient, followed by the 
coalition, and then the Unit Banks.  Equilibrium reserves are highest in the Unit Bank system, 
followed by the coalition, and then by the Big Bank system.  This corresponds to the comparison 
between the U.S. and Canada, shown in the previous table.  Also consistent with that comparison 
is the observed level of failures.  If there are withdrawals at date 1, there are no bank failures 
(liquidations) in the Big Bank system, but there are in the coalition system.  The entire banking 
system fails when there is a panic in the Unit Bank system.  As mentioned above, in Canada, the 
banking system shrank by the same order of magnitude as in the U.S. during the Great 
Depression, but there were no bank failures.  In the U.S. during the Great Depression, the private 
bank coalition system did not exist anymore (following the 1914 establishment of the Federal 
Reserve System), and the entire banking system was insolvent, with roughly 30 percent 
liquidated. 
VII. Discussion 
We studied the industrial organization of banking.  Banking systems with large, well-diversified, 
banks do not experience banking panics or failures.  Banking panics occur in systems of small 
Unit Banks.  Banking panics are not irrational.  Panics result from depositors 




moral hazard, but the depositors do not know which banks are the more likely because of 
asymmetric information.  The lender-of-last-resort function, including money creation, 
monitoring, and deposit insurance arose from private arrangements among banks.  Bank 
coalitions formed to monitor members and provide insurance to depositors.  Banking panics play 
a crucial role in making such private bank coalitions work.  Because of the panic banks are forced 
to commit to pool resources and liquidate some members. 
Note that the model could just as easily be interpreted as a model of the existence of banks.  The 
Unit Banking system can be thought of as a system of small firms, while the Big Bank system can 
be thought of as a Large Firm.  Again, these are two benchmarks.  Firms issue debt because this 
allows them to be monitored.  The coalition can now be thought of as a bank and the analysis 
demonstrates the role of intermediaries.  In either case, the key is the delegation of monitoring to 
a coalition/intermediary, but this depends upon the “panic” inducing the coalition/intermediary to 
monitor its members/borrowers. 
Why did government central banks replace private bank coalitions?  In the above analysis, there 
is no obvious rationale for the government to step in and provide the lender-of-last-resort function 
unless the government has much more power than private agents, more resources than private 
agents, or there are costs to panics that have not been considered.  Gorton and Huang (2001) 
consider the above model, but include a transactions role for bank liabilities.  A panic disrupts the 
role of bank liabilities as a medium of exchange.  They argue that in this context the government 
may be able to improve welfare with deposit insurance.   31
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1: The bankers solve the following optimization problem at date 0:  
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Proof of Proposition 2: A Big Bank solves the following optimization problem at date 0:  
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Proof of Lemma 3: Let G(x)= α  +(1+β−α)  xQ + (1+β−α)(1− f)  (1-x)( π + (1+  x )Μ)  -1 .  
G(x) is a continuous quadratic function of x.  Since G(0)<0 and G(1)>0, there exists a unique 
solution in the interval [0, 1] for the equation G(x)=0.  The solution is the smaller root of the 
quadratic equation, which is: 
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Proof of Proposition 3: The Big Bank’s problem at date 0 is:  
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Proof of Lemma 4: Suppose each bank holds reserve level α  and that the state of the 
macroeconomy is 





, i.e., there a panic.  Let us consider any measure of 
banks with any distribution function  ) ~ (r F  of idiosyncratic shocks in the interval [π , π +2M].  
Define r*=
) 1 )( f 1 (
1
α − β + −
α − -π.   We have f(1+β−α)(π +r) > α + (1+β−α)(π +r)-1 for r<r*, i.e., 
these bank types will engage in fraud; f(1+β−α)(π +r) = α + (1+β−α)(π +r)-1 for r=r*; and 
f(1+β−α)(π +r) < α + (1+β−α)(π +r)-1 for r>r*, i.e., these bank types will not engage in fraud.    
If there is no bank run, the banks with r<r* engage in fraud and the banks with r≥ r
* do not 
engage in fraud. The total payoff to all the banks is: 






− + π α − β + + α + + π α − β + ∫ ∫ . 
If these banks pool their liabilities, under any system of transfers among members, then they 
can be either solvent or insolvent at date 2.  If they are solvent, the total of their individual 
payoffs cannot exceed  ) r ~ ( dF ] 1 ) r )( 1 ( [
M 2
0 − + π α − β + + α ∫ , which can be reached when none 
of these banks engage in fraud.  If they are insolvent, the total of their payoffs cannot exceed 
) r ~ ( dF ) r )( 1 ( f
M 2
0 ∫ + π α − β + , which can be reached when all these banks engage in fraud. 
Therefore, the maximum total payoff from pooling under any system of transfers is:  
max{ ) r ~ ( dF ] 1 ) r )( 1 ( [
M 2
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M 2
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M 2
0 − + π α − β + + α ∫ ,   ) r ~ ( dF ) r )( 1 ( f
M 2
0 ∫ + π α − β + }, it is better for 
these banks choose not to pool their liabilities in a coalition.  That is, as a group it is a 
dominant strategy to deviate from any proposed coalition. 
Hence we have shown it would be better for the non-liquidated banks to stay independent 
Unit Banks if there is no bank panic. For those banks that are supposed to be liquidated, the 
bankers can get more from engaging in fraud than being liquidated.  Since the coalition 
maximizes the total payoffs to all member bankers, it is not going to operate without a bank 
panic.  //   36
Proof of Proposition 4: At date 1, depositors run the banks when 




1 . The 
coalition has to operate, choose P(α, π )=1, to save as many member banks as possible from 
being liquidated. The coalition starts the monitoring and coinsurance system. First, it can 
liquidate some member banks to improve the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks of those 
remaining banks.  Second, it can implement the system of transfers to pool liabilities.  We 
restrict the coalition’s actions to two functions: L(α, π , r) and D(α, π , r).  L(α, π , r) is a 
mapping from [0, 2M] to {1, 0}, indicating whether a member bank (in state {α, π})  with 
idiosyncratic shock r is to be liquidated (L=1) or not liquidated (L=0).  If the member is not 
liquidated, then the second rule, D(α, π , r), which is a mapping from [0, 2M] to R
+, indicates 
the liability reallocated to a member bank with idiosyncratic shock r.  
We first determine the best possible outcomes for the coalition.  Then we prove the 
equilibrium characterized in Proposition 4 generates the best possible outcome.   
If the coalition has to liquidate some of the member banks, it is always better to liquidate 
those banks with low realizations of idiosyncratic shocks. This is because all the risky 
projects have the same liquidation value.  For the liquidated member banks, the coalition 
gives the bankers α+(1+β−α) Q-1. On the one hand, the coalition has to pay them at least 
α+(1+β−α) Q-1, the worst possible payoff they can get if they quit; on the other hand, the 
coalition needs not to pay them more than α+(1+β−α) Q-1, since the incentives of these 
bankers no longer need to be considered. 
Now let us considered the non-liquidated member banks.  Suppose a fraction, x, of banks with 
low idiosyncratic shocks are liquidated. These will be the banks with the lowest shock 
realizations, so the remaining banks will have idiosyncratic shocks distributed in the interval: 
[x2M, 2M], which has a mean of (1+x)M.  According to Assumption 13, the coalition needs 
the original bankers to operate these banks.  In order to prevent a banker with idiosyncratic 
shock r from engaging in fraud, the coalition has to promise him a payoff of at least f(1+β -
α )(π +r).  Therefore, in order to convince depositors that their deposits are safe if they accept 
clearinghouse loan certificates, the coalition has to satisfy the following condition: 
∫ − + π α − β + + α
M 2
M 2 x
) r ~ ( dF ) 1 ) r )( 1 ( ( ≥ ∫ + π α − β +
M 2
M 2 x
) r ~ ( dF ) r )( 1 ( f .  Solving for x, we can 
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≥ .  The fraction x is between 0 and 1.  
Therefore, imposing this condition, in order to convince depositors that the remaining banks   37
have no incentives to engage in fraud, the coalition must liquidate a fraction, x, of the member 
banks such that  }} 1
- f M
- f 1
, 1 min{ , 0 max{ ) , ( * x x −
) α β + )(1 − (1
) α β + )(1 − (1 π − α −
≡ π α ≥ .  
The coalition’s task is now reduced to finding the minimum x that can be accepted by the 
depositors.  According to the proposition, in equilibrium the coalition only needs to liquidate 
exactly x*(α, π ) of banks.  We need to check whether the coalition’s sharing rules can prevent 
the non-liquidated member banks from engaging in fraud and depositors’ beliefs satisfying 
equilibrium requirements. Moreover, we need to check whether depositors’ off equilibrium 
path beliefs ensure that the coalition has no profitable deviation. 
First, non-liquidated member banks have no incentive to engage in fraud.  A non-liquidated 
member bank with idiosyncratic shock of r owes a liability of D(α, π , r)=α  +(1-
f)(1+β−α)(π +r) to the coalition.  If it does not engage in fraud and honors its liabilities, its 
payoff is α  +(1+β−α)(π +r)- {α  +(1-f)(1+β−α)(π +r)}=  f(1+β−α)(π +r), which is what it can 
get from engaging in fraud. Thus, it has no incentive to engage in fraud. 
Second, depositors observe all the banks remain with the coalition and a fraction x*(α,π ) of 
member banks are liquidated.  To be consistent with the actions taken by the coalition and its 
members, their beliefs must be that banks with idiosyncratic shocks in the interval: [0, 
x*(α,π )2M] are liquidated and banks with idiosyncratic shocks in the complementary interval, 
[x*(α,π )2M, 2M], are not liquidated and have no incentive to engage in fraud.  According to 
their updated beliefs, their deposits are safe and they accept the certificates.  We need to 
specify depositors’ off equilibrium path beliefs.  Suppose depositors observe a fraction y of 
banks quit the coalition, a fraction z of the banks remain non-liquidated in the coalition and a 
fraction 1-y-z of banks are liquidated by the coalition.  They believe that the idiosyncratic 
shocks of those banks out of the coalition are distributed in the interval: [0, y2M], and the 
idiosyncratic shocks of those non-liquidated banks in the coalition are distributed in the 
interval: [(1-z)2M, 2M]. 
Finally, we check that the coalition has no profitable deviation. There are two possible 
deviations for the coalition.  The coalition can liquidate a fraction of member banks less than 
x*(α,π ).  Or it can carry out a different set of sharing rules.  According to depositors’ off 
equilibrium path beliefs, if the coalition liquidates a fraction of banks less than x*(α,π ), the 
certificates will not be accepted by depositors and all the member banks will be liquidated. 
Therefore, this is not a profitable deviation.  On the other hand, no matter what kind of 
sharing rules are carried out inside the coalition, the coalition can either be solvent or 
insolvent at date 2.  If the coalition is solvent at date 2, its maximum payoff is:  (1-   38
x*(α,π ))(α +(1+β -α )(π +(1+x*(α,π ))M)-1),  which can be reached when none of the remaining 
member banks engage in fraud.  If the coalition is insolvent due to some members engaging in 
fraud, its maximum payoff is: (1- x*(α,π ))f(1+β -α )(π +(1+ x*(α,π ))M), reached when all the 
non-liquidated banks engage in fraud. Since (α +(1+β -α )(π +(1+ x*(α,π ))M)-1)= f(1+β -
α )(π +(1+ x*(α,π ))M) if x*(α,π )<1, the coalition has no profitable deviation from the 
specified sharing rules. // 
Proof of Proposition 5: The coalition’s objective function is: 
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less than 1, which means that there is no need to liquidate all the member banks.  Then the 
objective function can be written as: 
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≤ π , which means the coalition 
needs to liquidate all the member banks when π  is low enough.  Then the objective function 
can be written as:   39
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Moreover when α=α *,  π∗=π L, we have EV
1(α *)=EV









*) ( dEV 2 1
. 
Therefore, EV
B(α ) is a strictly concave function of α  and there is a unique  ] , 0 [ max
B α α ∈  
that solves the coalition’s optimization problem. 
To prove that all the banks are willing to join the coalition, we need to show that the expected 
payoff from joining the coalition is larger than that from operating as an independent bank. 
This is part of the proof of Proposition 6, below.  // 
Proof of Proposition 6: Since we have shown that the objective functions are concave, it 













B C U ) ( ) ( ) (
> > .  Let 










Q) -   M +   (
d
d



















( − =  
) ~ dF(   Q) -   M x + ( x )
2
1

































  ) ~ dF(   Q) -   M x + ( x   )
2
1

































Since we have  1 < <







C B x x













B C U ) ( ) ( ) (
> > . Therefore 
U C B α α α < < . 
Proof of Proposition 7: Given α  and π , we use x
B(α, π ), x
C(α, π ), and x
U(α, π ) to denote the 
fraction of banks (or projects) that need to be liquidated under the Big Bank system, the 
coalition, and the Unit Bank system, respectively. And we use EV
B(α, π ), EV
C(α, π ), and 
EV
U(α, π ) to denote the average payoff, respectively, to a bank (or project) over the 
distribution of idiosyncratic shock r under these three systems.    41
When 








U(α, π )=0, so there is no need to liquidate 
any banks (projects) under any of the three systems. Therefore, EV
B(α, π )=EV
C(α, π )= 
EV
U(α, π )=α +(1+β−α)(π +M)-1. 
When 
) α β + )(1 − (1
α −
< π ≤ −








C(α, π )=0, x
U(α, π )=1, the 
independent Unit Banks are liquidated, while there is no need to liquidate any banks 
(projects) under the Big Bank system or the coalition system. 
EV
B(α, π )=EV
C(α, π )=α +(1+β−α)(π +M)-1, EV









) α β + )(1 − (1
α −
< π , x
B(α, π )<x
C(α, π )≤ x
U(α, π )=1, there are liquidations under all 
the three systems.  All the independent unit banks have to be liquidated.  Only a fraction of 
the banks (projects) need to be liquidated under the Big Bank system and the coalition 
system.  Note that: 
x
C(α, π ) solves: (1+β−α) ( π + (1+  x )Μ)  -1=f(1+β−α) ( π + (1+  x )Μ).     
x
B(α, π ) solves: 
  α  +(1+β−α)  xQ + (1+β−α)  (1-x)( π + (1+  x )Μ)  -1=f(1+β−α)  (1-x)( π + (1+  x )Μ).   
Since  α  +(1+β−α)  x
C(α, π ) Q + (1+β−α)  (1- x
C(α, π ))( π + (1+ x
C(α, π )  )Μ)  -1= α  +(1+β−α)  
x
C(α, π ) Q+ f(1+β−α)  (1-x)( π + (1+  x  )Μ)>  f(1+β−α)  (1-x)( π + (1+ x )Μ),  we have 
x
B(α, π )<x
C(α, π ).  
EV
B(α, π )=α +x
B(α, π )(1+β−α) Q+(1-x
B(α, π ))(1+β−α)(π +(1+x
B(α, π ))M)-1,  
EV
C(α, π )=α +x
C(α, π )(1+β−α) Q+(1-x
C(α, π ))(1+β−α)(π +(1+x
C(α, π ))M)-1, 
EV
U(α, π )=α +(1+β−α) Q-1. 
Therefore, we have EV
B(α, π )>EV
C(α, π )≥ EV




) α β + )(1 − (1
α −
< π . 
Since we have EV
B(α, π )≥ EV
C(α, π )≥ EV




U(α, π ) for some α  and π,   the Big Bank system dominates the 
coalition, which dominates the Unit Bank system. //   42
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